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The problem of immunity and irresponsibility, of governments
in matters relating to wrongs or damages inflicted upon innocent
citizens has evoked considerable discussion, particularly in the last
quarter century. The inequities of the immunity doctrine have been
plainly portrayed and adequately condemned by many authorities,"
but the traditional concept of sovereign freedom from suit is not
entirely friendless.2  There is considerable disagreement as to the
extent to which the immunity should be swept away and as to the
liability that should replace it. It is even difficult to arrive at a fair
appraisal of the present scope of liability imposed, or immunity
preserved, in a given jurisdiction because of the manner of enacting
appropriate statutes in piecemeal fashion. It will be the purpose
of this paper to help define the present areas of liability and im-
munity of the various local governments in Ohio.
MuNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS
In determining liability of governmental units in the absence
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YmiN. L. REV. 293, 480, 700, 854 (1942); Fordham and Pegues, Local Gov-
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Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 1, 129, 229
(1925), 36 YALE L. J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926); Proposed State and Local Statutes
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Cash, Ex Delicto Liability of Counties in Iowa, 10 IowA L. BuLL. 16 (1924).
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of controlling statutes, the courts usually resort to a test making a
distinction between the exercise of governmental and proprietary
functions. A similar technique with slightly different emphasis
uses a criterion which distinguishes discretionary and ministerial
action. The Ohio courts follow the same practice.,
Accordingly, as the character of the activity in which the mu-
nicipality was engaged at the time of the accident falls into the
governmental or discretionary category on the one hand, or the
proprietary or ministerial on the other, liability is either imposed
or rejected. Objections to such an arbitrary and mechanical device
arise not only from the difficulty of social justification but also from
the inconsistency and confusion in determining which cases go
into a given category. There is no unanimity of opinion as to what
functions are governmental and what are proprietary, and the courts
frequently resort to fine distinctions to escape the rigors of a prior
decision. Adding to the uncertainty is the fact that certain things
may be used in either a governmental or proprietary capacity.'
Generally speaking, matters pertaining to police and fire pro-
tection,5 construction and repair of streets,6 and the construction of
IE.g., Selden v. Cuyahoga Falls, 132 Ohio St. 223, 6 N.E. 2d 976
(1937); Wooster v. Arbenz, 116 Ohio St. 281, 156 N.E. 210 (1927); Tolliver
v. Newark, 145 Ohio St. 517, 62 N.E. 2d 357 (1945); Note, Municipal Corpo-
rations-Tort Liability, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 174 (1948).
- Sturzinger v. Sandusky, 28 Ohio App. 263, 162 N.E. 684 (1927);
Lebanon v. Loop, 4 Ohio Op. 480, 32 N.E. 2d 458 (1935).
5 Aldrich v. Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N.E. 164 (1922); Cin-
cinnati v. Butterfield, 14 Ohio App. 395, 32 Ohio C.A. 546 (1921); Frederick
v. Columbus, 58 Ohio St. 538 (1898); Thomas v. Findlay, 6 Ohio C.C. 241,
3 Ohio C.D. 435 (1892) (above cases hold there is no liability for negli-
gent operation of police and fire equipment). Contra: Fowler v. Cleveland,
100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N.E. 72 (1919) (now overruled by the Aldrich case);
Schmelzer v. Columbus, 24 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 90 (1922) (based on the idea
that home rule powers made a difference and decided during the period when
the holding of Fowler v. Cleveland represented the law). That there is no
liability for mobs or riots see: Western College v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio St.
375 (1861); Robinson v. Greenville, 42 Ohio St. 625, 51 Am. Rep. 857
(1885). Also in point are: Wittenbrook v. Columbus, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 586,
35 N.E. 2d 980 (1941) (No liability for death of prisoner due to lack of
medical care); Besser v. County Commissioners, 58 Ohio App. 499, 16 N.E.
2d 947 (1938) (No liability for injuries of a prisoner sustained when at-
tacked by another prisoner); Rose v. Toledo, 1 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 321, 14
Ohio C.D. 540 (1903) (No liability to prisoner in workhouse whose health
was ruined by confinement in dungeon); Green v. Commissioners, 3 Ohio
C.C. (N.S.) 212, 13 Ohio C.D. 43 (1901) (No liability to minor injured in
workhouse while running a defective machine under compulsion); Alvord
v. Richmond, 3 Ohio N.P. 136 (1896) (No-liability for unlawful arrest or
improper care resulting in death).
6 Boone v. Akron, 69 Ohio App. 95, 43 N.E. 2d 315 (1942); Roetker v.
.Portsmouth, 64 Ohio App. 146, 28 N.E. 2d 372 (1940); Kohake v. utmcinnatl,
59 Ohio App. 403, 18 N.E. 2d 501 (1938); Tetlow v. Youngstown, 49 Ohio
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sewers7 are considered governmental, and no liability is imposed on
the municipality for tortious conduct in the carrying on of these
activities. Conversely, the construction and operation of public
utility services, 8 and the maintenance as contrasted with the con-
struction of sewers9 are considered proprietary functions and liabil-
ity is imposed for wrongful acts. Liability is also imposed for
stream pollution and flooding" because of public improvements ir-
respective of the character of the activity which caused the damage.
Recovery in these cases is based on a theory either of nuisance or
expropriation of property without compensation."
It is interesting to note that the earliest Ohio cases adopted an
attitude favoring liability of both municipal and county govern-
ments without differentiating the various functions they per-
formed.12 In those cases, the chief concern seemed to be to derive
App. 540, 197 N.E. 426 (1934); Wooster v. Arbenz, 116 Ohio St. 281, 156
N.E. 210 (1927); Circleville v. Sohn, 59 Ohio St. 285, 52 N.E. 788 (1898)
(held the duty was ministerial but this case was distinguished in the
Wooster case). For the effect of the OHIo GENERAL CODE §§3714 and 3714-1
(1938), see infra pp. 381, 392 n. 103.
7 State ex rel. Gordon v. Taylor, 149 Ohio St. 427, 79 N.E. 2d 127
(1948); Hutchinson v. Lakewood, 125 Ohio St. 100, 180 N.E. 643 (1932);
Bluhm v. Blanck and Gargaro, 62 Ohio App. 451, 24 N.E. 2d 615 (1939).8 Interstate Sash and Door Co. v. Cleveland, 36 Ohio Op. 27, 73 N.E.
2d 236 (1947), aff'd, 148 Ohio St. 325, 74 N.E. 2d 239 (1947); Barberton v.
Miksch, 128 Ohio St. 169, 190 N.E. 387 (1934); Salem v. Harding, 121 Ohio
St. 412 at 417, 169 N.E. 457 (1929) (All stating that a water system is a
proprietary function); Cleveland v. North Olmsted, 130 Ohio St. 144, 198
N.E. 41 (1935) (bus line is a proprietary function); Columbus v. Lynn,
17 Ohio L. Abs. 658 (1934) (electric light plant is a proprietary function);
Werner v. Cincinnati, 3 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 276, 13 Ohio C.D. 475 (1902) (city
liable for the negligent breaking of pipes); Lakewood v. Newell, 16 Ohio
C.C. (N.S.) 503, 28 Ohio C.D. 682 (1907) (city liable for conversion of pipes);
Cincinnati v. George, 14 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 447, 23 Ohio C.D. 510 (1911),
aff'd, 88 Ohio St. 567, 106 N.E. 1050 (1913) (city liable for negligent cutting
off of water suply). But the city is not liable for water pressure inade-
quate to extinguish fires. Blunk v. Dennison Water Supply Co., 71 Ohio
St. 250, 73 N.E. 210 (1905); Akron Waterworks Co. v. Brownless, 10 Ohio
C.C. 620, 5 Ohio C.D. 1 (1895).
9State ex rel. Gordon v. Taylor, 149 Ohio St. 427, 79 N.E. 2d 127
(1948); Portsmouth v. Mitchell Co., 113 Ohio St. 250, 148 N.E. 846 (1925).
But see Etzensperger and Orschak v. Cleveland, 25 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 303,
35 Ohio C.D. 254 (1902), holding that the construction of a building is
ministerial.
'oKirk v. Cincinnati, 25 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 473 (1925); Mansfield v.
Balliett, 65 Ohio St. 451, 63 N.E. 86 (1901); Cleveland v. Beaumont, 4 Ohio
D. Rep. 444, Ohio L. Bull. 345 (1875); Rhodes v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio
160 (1840).
11 Mansfield v. Balliett, supra note 10.
12 Commissioners of Brown County v. Butt, 2 Ohio 349 (182"); Good-
loe v. Cincinnati, 4 Ohio 500 (1831); Smith v. Cincinnati, 4 Ohio 514 (1831);
Rhodes v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio 160 (1840); McCombs v. Akron, 15 Ohio 474
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a just rule that would promote substantial justice. Need was felt
for making all corporations responsibile for their wrongs to the
same extent as individuals,13 and justice was thought to be pro-
moted by diffusing among all those who shared in the benefit any
losses that might be incidentally inflicted from the exercise of gov-
ernmental activity."
Gradually, however, the Ohio courts developed the above men-
tioned tests of functional distinctions 1 and lined up substantially
with the English and other American courts, thus starting with
the underlying assumption of immunity and engrafting exceptions
of liability. The germ of the governmental versus proprietary
classification can be ascertained in Commissioners of Hamilton
County v. Mighels.1e In this case it was asserted that a county was
immune from liability for negligence, but that a municipal or pri-
vate corporation under like circumstances would be liable. The
reasons advanced for this distinction were as follows:
As before remarked, municipal corporations proper
are called into existence, either at the direct solicitation
or by the free consent of the people who compose them.
Counties are local subdivisions of a State, created by
the sovereign power of the State, of its own sovereign will,
without the particular solicitation, consent, or concurrent
action of the people who inhabit them....
A municipal corporation proper is created mainly for
the interest, advantage, and convenience of the locality
and its people; a county organization is created almost ex-
clusively with a view to the policy of the State at large
17
The pronouncement of the dual capacity of the municipality
was clearly enunciated a few years later in Western College v.
Cleveland: '-
• . . It is obvious that there is a distinction between
those powers delegated to municipal corporations to pre-
serve the peace and protect persons and property, whether
to be exercised by legislation or the appointment of proper
officers, and those powers and privileges which are to be
exercised for the improvement of the territory comprised
within the limits of the corporation, and its adaptation to
the purposes of residence or business. As to the first, the
municipal corporation represents the state - discharging
duties incumbent on the state; as to the second, the mu-
(1846), aff'd after trial, 18 Ohio 229 (1849).
13 Goodloe v. Cincinnati, supra note 12; Rhodes v. Cleveland, supra
note 12; McCombs v. Akron, supra note 12.
14 McCombs v. Akron, 15 Ohio 474 (1846) and 18 Ohio 229 (1849).
15 The governmental vs. proprietary and the discretionary vs. minis-
terial tests discussed in material preceding note 4 supra.
16 7 Ohio St. 109 (1857).
' 
7 d. at 118, 119.
1812 Ohio St. 375 (1861).
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nicipal corporation represents the pecuniary and proprie-
tary interests of individuals.19
Except for a brief period from 1919 to 1922 when, by a bold
break with precedent, the Supreme Court seemed ready to over-
throw the immunity doctrine, 20 the courts of Ohio have steadfastly
limited liability by the traditional application of the governmental
versus proprietary and discretionary versus ministerial tests. The
repudiation in Fowler v. Cleveland21 was itself shortly repudiated in
Aldrich v. Youngstown,22 and since then most changes have come
from the legislature.
Statutory Liability
The most common -basis for imposing liability on the munici-
pality arises from a breach of duty provided for in General Code
Section 3714:
Municipal corporations shall have special power to
regulate the use of the streets, to be exercised in the man-
ner provided by law. The council shall have the care,
supervision, and control of public highways, streets, alleys,
sidewalks, public grounds, bridges, aqueducts, and viaducts,
within the corporation, and shall cause them to be kept
open, in repair, and free from nuisance.23
The substance of this statute has been incorporated into Ohio
law from an early date, traceable at least to 1852,24 the first session
of the General Assembly under the Constitution of 1851. More-
over, before it was made a general statutory provision, similar pro-
visions were probably included in the special acts incorporating
municipalities.2 5 The general theory for imposing liability under
this section is that the municipality is permitting the existence of
a nuisance by failing to keep the public ways clear, open, in repair,
and safe for the normal uses thereof:
Nuisance
As noted, the gist of the action under this statute is nuisance
and not negligence, although many of the nuisances are predicated
upon negligence. This factor, plus the rule that contributory negli-
gence by the plaintiff is a complete defense,2 at least in the latter
cases, results understandably in considerable ambiguity in this area.
However, it has been repeatedly held that negligence alone is not
19 Id. at 377.
2oFowler v. Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N.E. 72 (1919).
21 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N.E. 72 (1919).
22106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N.E. 164 (1922).
2
-O3Io GEN. CODE §3714 (1938).
2450 Onto LAws 244, §63 (1852).
25 E.g., the act discussed in Langley v. Gallipolis, 2 Ohio St. 108
(1853).
26lnfra note 128.
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enough to fasten liability on the municipality.27 The first problem,
then, is to ascertain the meaning of nuisance.
Various definitions of the word nuisance have been propounded
by the text writers and accepted by the courts. The Ohio Supreme
Court at one time or another has quoted the following with ap-
proval:
The term nuisance, derived from the French word
'nuire', to do hurt or to annoy, is applied in the English
law indiscriminately to infringements upon the enjoyment
of proprietary and personal rights.2
Nuisance, something noxious or offensive. Anything not
authorized by law which maketh hurt, inconvenience, or
damage. It may be (a) private, as where one so uses his
property as to damage another's, or disturb his quiet en-
joyment of it; (b) public or common, where the whole com-
munity is annoyed or inconvenienced by the offensive acts,
as where one obstructs a highway, or carries on a trade
that fills the air with noxious and offensive fumes.
2 9
Nuisance has been defined as a distinct civil wrong,
consisting of anything wrongfully done or permitted which
interferes with or annoys another in the enjoyment of his
legal rights."'
A distinction must be made between absolute nuisances or
nuisances per se, and nuisances predicated upon negligence.', In
cases of the former type strict liability is imposed when damage
results therefrom, but in cases of the latter type, a want of ordinary
care by the defendant plus an absence of contributory negligence
by the plaintiff must coexist in order to permit recovery. A search-
ing examination of nuisance law and a significant classification of
several types of tortious conduct in this area have been made by
Judge Hart in Taylor v. Cincinnati.3 2 The type of nuisance that is
enjoined by Section 3714 may be of either the absolute or qualified
27 Snider v. Youngstown, 27 Ohio L. Abs. 231 (1938); Rudibaugh v.
Niles, 56 Ohio App. 451, 11 N.E. 2d 193 (1937); Selden v. Cuyahoga Falls,
132 Ohio St. 223, 6 N.E. 2d 976 (1937). On the other hand, both negligence
and nuisance need not be shown as nuisance alone is a sufficient predicate
of liability. Kremer v. Uhrichsville, 67 Ohio App. 61, 35 N.E. 2d 973 (1940).
In this case the court did not distinguish between absolute and qualified
nuisance. An instruction requiring proof of negligence in cases of a
qualified nuisance is proper. Corbin v. Cleveland, 144 Ohio St. 32 at 36,
56 N.E. 2d 214 (1944). Cf. Taylor v. Cincinnati, 143 Ohio St. 426, 55 N.E
2d 724 (1944).
28Village of Cardington v. Fredericks, 46 Ohio St. 442, 446, 21 N.E
766, 767 (1889).
21 Ibid.
30 Taylor v. Cincinnati, 143 Ohio St. 426, 436, 55 N.E. 2d 724, 730 (1944)
31 Gaines v. Wyoming, 147 Ohio St. 491, 72 N.E. 2d 369 (1947); Inter.
state Sash and Door Co. v. Cleveland, 148 Ohio St. 325, 74 N.E. 2d 23!
(1947); Comment, Absolute and Qualified IAruisance in Ohio, 9 OHio S7
L.J. 164 (1948).
32 143 Ohio St. 426, 55 N.E. 2d 724 (1944).
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variety.3 3 The following statement is found in Judge Hart's opinion:
... doubtless if it should dig a deep trench across a
street or place an obstruction in the travelled portion
thereof in the nighttime without guards; making travel
thereon necessarily dangerous, the municipality might be
subject to strict liability under the rules above set out;
but so long as its conduct is not unlawful or extra hazard-
ous, the municipality is liable for injuries resulting only
from its negligent failure to take proper precautions by the
removal of obstructions, or by the erection of barriers,
guardrails, lights or otherwise, to safeguard travellers
against dangerous obstructions, defects, or conditions in
streets and other public ways.3 4
An examination of some of the cases under this statute may help
clarify the present extent of municipal tort liability in Ohio.
Streets
Various types of actions concerning streets may arise under
Ohio General Code Section 3714, a very common type being the alle-
gation of nuisance because of some defect, obstruction, or other con-
dition in the street itself. A large number of these cases involve ques-
tions for the jury as to whether the city had notice of the particular
defect and was negligent in permitting it to exist. According to the
facts, therefore, similar conditions may constitute a nuisance in
one case and not in another.
If there is any construction work underway and adequate
guardrails and warning devices are not installed, the city will very
likely be held liable for any damages that may result therefrom.
Thus, recovery was permitted for losses resulting from a ditch,8 5
a hole,3 6 a cistern construction, 7 and concrete abutments.38 Like-
33 Taylor v. Cincinnati, supra note 32. Cf. Larson v. Cleveland Ry., 142
Ohio St. 20, 50 N.E. 2d 163 (1943) which says that if the statute defines
duties in abstract terms, as in Ohio General Code Section 3714, the jury
must determine the reasonableness of the conduct.
34 Taylor v. Cincinnati, supra note 32.
35Stephens v. Trotwood, 39 Ohio L. Abs. 444, 53 N.E. 2d 647 (1943),
aff'd, 43 Ohio L. Abs. 157 (1943).
30 Central Union Telephone Company v. Conneaut, 167 Fed. 274
(C.C.A. 6th 1909) (The city had the hole dug for a utility pole, but
neglected to put in the pole for over three months.)
37 Circleville v. Neuding, 41 Ohio St. 465, 13 Ohio L. Bull. 378 (1885).
3 8 Craig v. City of Toledo, 60 Ohio App. 474, 21 N.E. 2d 1003 (1938)
(Abutments placed at right angles to the street for foundations for an un-
finished bridge. They were difficult to see at night). Similar cases include:
Miller v. Dayton, 70 Ohio App. 173, 41 N.E. 2d 728 (1941) (Unlighted pole
in the center of the street); Brown v. Columbus, 27 Ohio L. Abs. 677 (1938)
(tree in street); City of Hamilton v. Dilley, 120 Ohio St. 127, 165 N.E. 713
(1929) (Unlighted safety zone under construction); Shields v. Cleveland,
21 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 257, 33 Ohio C.D. 338 (1905) (hole for construction);
Cleveland v. King, 132 U.S. 295 (1889) (Building material of abutting
owner left in street, jury found notice to city).
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wise, liability may be imposed if the city is so negligent in its
maintenance that a number of big holes"9 or excessive tar" results.
Recovery is not limited to those people who use the street as a
means of travel from one place to another, but anyone making
ordinary or normal use of the street is protected. Hence, a minor
may recover for injuries sustained while coasting when the in-
juries are caused by a "hump" resulting from the laying of a water
main.-1 In general, then, it seems that if the condition of the street
is such as to substantially increase the risk of danger to the general
public using the street in a normal and ordinary manner, and if
injuries or losses do result from such a condition, then liability is
imposed on the municipality if it actually knew or should have
known of the condition.
Conversely, liability is not imposed if the municipality does
not have actual or constructive notice of the defect or if the condi-
tion is not inherently dangerous. Thus, in the absence of notice,
the city is not made liable for a misplaced manhole cover,42 Un-
lighted building material of an abutting owner,43 or a hole in the
street.44 Similarly, the existence of certain things in the street
that might reasonably be expected to be there are not per se
nuisances but may entail liability if special facts are shown. Thus
a parked truck, 5 an automobile parked in a street set aside for
coasting, 6 a safety zone,4 7 and a traffic light48 were all held not to
39 Erb v. Youngstown, 62 Ohio App. 482, 24 N.E. 2d 629 (1937).
40 Seiter v. Marion, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 374 (1938).
41 City of Girard v. Smrek, 52 Ohio App. 135, 3 N.E. 2d 560 (1935).
Kercher v. Conneaut, 76 Ohio App. 491, 65 N.E. 2d 272 (1945) (a bicyclist
was allowed to recover); see Davis v. Shutrump Co., 140 Ohio St. 89, 42 N.E.
2d 663 (1942) (Employee of contractor not permitted to recover because
street was closed and he was not using it as a means of travel); Boone v.
Akron, 69 Ohio App. 95, 43 N.E. 2d 315 (1942) (City not liable for failure
to build sewers and thus abate a nuisance, because the duty under the
statute is confined to physical conditions which affect travel and does not
extend to conditions created by others which are merely offensive to sight
and smell.)
42 Cleveland v. Amato, 123 Ohio St. 575, 176 N.E. 227 (1931); Cleve-
land v. Pine, 123 Ohio St. 578, 176 N.E. 229 (1931).
3 Columbus v. Penrod, 73 Ohio St. 209, 76 N.E. 826 (1906); cf. Cleve-
land v. King, 132 U.S. 295 (1889) in which case liability was imposed.
4" Connelly v. Youngstown, 27 Ohio L. Abs. 699 (1938); Hunter v.
Lakewood, 35 Ohio App. 132, 171 N.E. 842 (1930).
4 Galluppi v. Youngstown, 55 Ohio App. 331, 9 N.E. 2d 739 (1936).
46 Mingo Junction v. Sheline, 130 Ohio St. 34, 196 N.E. 897 (1935).
47 Cleveland v. Gustafson,. 124 Ohio St. 607, 180 N.E. 59 (1932); Moss-
inan v. Cincinnati, 10 Ohio Op. 335, 34 N.E. 2d 246 (1936).
48 Springfield v. Good, 14 Ohio L. Abs. 5 (1933). Other conditions
not found to be nuisances include: a traffic sign facing the wrong way,
Tolliver v. Newark, 145 Ohio St. 517, 62 N.E. 2d 357 (1945); a traffic light
where one side was not working, Martin v. Canton, 41 Ohio App. 420, 180
[Vol. 9
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be nuisances. Furthermore, the municipality is not an insurer and
need only keep the street in a reasonably safe condition. 9
In addition to conditions in the street itself, frequently a nui-
sance is alleged because of some defect or obstruction in the area
in close proximity to the streets. As will be shown, the duty to
keep the streets clear from nuisance is applicable to the sidewalks
alsoY° Apparently, however, plaintiffs have not been very success-
ful in alleging a violation of the statutory duty when the supposed
nuisance is near the sidewalk but away from the street. The Ohio
courts uniformly invoke the doctrine of strict construction and
guard against extension of liability. Accordingly, it has been held
that a hole six feet back of the sidewalk,5 1 and a wall along the
sidewalk from which a child fell into a hole5 2 were not nuisances
within the purview of Ohio General Code Section 3714. Similarly, no
recovery is permitted for injuries resulting from the negligent
regulation of a shooting gallery since such regulation is a govern-
mental function and the gallery is not a nuisance per se.53 It is
recognized, however, that the city's duty does not stop with the
improved part of the street, but extends to the areas in close prox-
imity thereto so that users of the street may not be unreasonably
endangered.5 4
The duty imposed on the municipality under Ohio General
Code Section 3714 is not such as to impose liability for the negligence
of street repairmen improving the street. Accordingly, a child
burned by a fire maintained by street repairmen,55 and a person in-
jured in a collision with a city repair truck' may not recover
against the city because such activity is a governmental function
and the city is not liable for negligence. On the other hand, the
municipality may still be liable under Ohio General Code Section
N.E. 78 (1931); a traffic standard, Ruechert v. Shaker Heights, 25 Ohio
L. Abs. 10 (1937).
49Dayton v. Glaser, 76 Ohio St. 471, 81 N.E. 991 (1907); Taylor v.
Cincinnati, 143 Ohio St. 426, 55 N.E. 2d 724 (1944); Kercher v. Conneaut,
76 Ohio App. 491, 502, 65 N.E. 2d 272, 279 (1945).
590 1nfra p. 386.
5' Village of Mineral City v. Gilbow, 81 Ohio St. 263, 90 N.E. 800
(1909).5 Rudibaugh v. Niles, 56 Ohio App. 451, 11 N.E. 2d 193 (1937); Ellis
v. Youngstown, 140 Ohio St. 133, 42 N.E. 2d 760 (1942) (a barricade in
front of a ravine at a street intersection not a nuisance).
53 Kreiger v. Doylestown, 25 Ohio App. 286, 158 N.E. 197 (1927).
1 Karle v. Street Ry., 69 Ohio App. 327, 43 N.E. 2d 762 (1942). (The
case was concerned with street railway tracks immediately adjacent to
both sides of a narrow, crowned street. Judgment on the verdict for the
defendants was affirmed, however.)
55 Tetlow v. Youngstown, 49 Ohio App. 540, 197 N.E. 426 (1934).
50 Wooster v. Arbenz, 116 Ohio St. 281, 156 N.E. 210 (1927). The
rule of this case has now been changed by Ohio General Code Section
3714-1, infra p. 392 n. 103.
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3714 although the street or highway was constructed and is main-
tained by another political unit.5 7
Sidewalks
The same type of duty that is imposed on the municipality by
Ohio General Code Section 3714 to keep the streets free from nuis-
ance is likewise imposed in relation to the sidewalks. Similar rules
of construction apply so that liability is imposed if the city has no-
tice of the defect or disrepair and is negligent in not making re-
57 Stephens v. Trotwood, 39 Ohio L. Abs. 444, 53 N.E. 2d 647 (1943),
motion to certify record overruled, 43 Ohio L. Abs. 157 (1943) (village
liable for nuisance in state highway running through village when it did
not warn and protect the public from an excavation); O'Neill v. Cleveland,
145 Ohio St. 563, 62 N.E. 2d 353 (1945) (the county and municipality are
not joint tortfeasors but apparently recognizing that both could be liable
although on different bases; cases cited in notes 136 and 148 recognize the
duties and liabilities of both the county and municipality in relation to
bridges, but a valid distinction could be made between roads and bridges
in that Ohio General Code §§ 2421, 7557, and 7563 (1938) impose special
duties on the county in relation to bridges and guard rails. A distinction
can also be made between losses resulting from the construction or repair
itself, in which case the political division doing the work might be solely
liable, Sheppard v. Commissioners, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 153, 26 Ohio L. Rep.
81 (1927), and losses resulting from failure to keep the road in repair and
free from nuisance after it has been constructed, in which case the munici-
pality might also be liable, Bruns v. Commissioners, 52 Ohio App. 325, 334,
335, 3 N.E. 2d 675, 679 (1936); Andrews v. Georgetown, 34 Ohio App. 79, 170
N.E. 450 (1929). Some cases have held the municipality responsible on
the theory that under recent statutes it had to consent to the other unit's
construction of the road and so was responsible just as if it had done the
work itself, Andrews v. Georgetown, 34 Ohio App. 79, 170 N.E. 450 (1929);
Sroka v. Green Cab Co., 35 Ohio App. 438, 172 N.E. 531 (1929), dismissed
on other grounds, 122 Ohio St. 45 (1930), but there is also authority to the
effect that such consent is not a sufficient predicate of liability, Bruns v.
Commissioners, supra; Sheppard v. Commissioners, supra. A holding that
only the state is responsible for failure to repair a state highway running
through a village, Younts v. Avon Lake, 19 Ohio App. 182, 3 Ohio L. Abs.
591 (1925), has been distinguished and liability imposed on the basis that
the present applicable statutes are different from those then in effect which
gave exclusive control to the state, Bruns v. Commissioners, 52 Ohio App.
325, 332 (1936), Grove City v. Ream, 5 Ohio L. Abs. 181 (1927). It has
been held that a county road loses its character as such when it is located
within a municipality and that only the municipality is liable for defects
in such portion of a county road as is located within its corporate limits,
Sroka v. Green Cab Co., supra. On the other hand, it has been held that
there is no liability of the county for a state highway, Weiher v. Phillips,
103 Ohio St. 249, 133 N.E. 67 (1921). Although the division of responsibility
between various political units in relation to roads maintained by the
county or the state and running through a municipality is not as definite
as might be desired, it would seem that at least in some cases liability
would be imposed on the municipality. Liability might also be imposed
on another political unit in a proper case.
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pairs.5 8 Liability may even be imposed where the dangerous condi-
tion is caused by poor planning and negligent construction or re-
pairs.5 Here too, apparently, the city's duty extends somewhat
beyond the actual paving of the walk, the test probably being
whether or not one can make normal use of the walk without being
endangered. 0 Dangerous conditions caused by the natural elements
do not create liability.0 1
Bridges
The duty to keep bridges open, in repair, and free from nuisance
is likewise specifically enjoined upon municipalities by Ohio Gen-
eral Code Section 3714. Similar to the liability imposed for the poor
r8 Nairn v. Columbus, 35 Ohio L. Abs. 45 (1941) (hole in sidewalk);
Dzuracky v. City of Campbell, 64 Ohio App. 521, 29 N.E. 2d 49 (1939)
(broken sidewalk); Photokos v. Youngstown, 23 Ohio L. Abs. 622 (1936)
(sidewalk trapdoor); Cleveland v. Hanson, 15 Ohio App. 409 (1921), aff'd,
105 Ohio St. 646, 138 N.E. 925 (1922) (worn out cellar way covering);
Toledo v. Radbone, 3 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 382, 13 Ohio C.D. 268 (1901), aff'd,
68 Ohio St. 687, 70 N.E. 1117 (1903) (constructive notice applied); Wilhelm
v. Defiance, 58 Ohio St. 56, 50 N.E. 18 (1898) (city ordered lot owner to
repair his walk, and he negligently did so); Toledo v. Higgins, 12 Ohio
C.C. 541, 5 Ohio C.D. 485 (1896) (nonconformity to grade).
r9 Circleville v. Sohn, 59 Ohio St. 285, 52 N.E. 788 (1898).
60 Village of Mineral City v. Gilbow, 81 Ohio St. 263, 90 N.E. 800 (1909)
(no liability where hole was six feet back of sidewalk); Rudibaugh v. Niles,
56 Ohio App. 451, 11 N.E. 2d 193 (1937) (no liability where there was a re-
taining wall 4" higher than the sidewalk and 16" wide between sidewalk
and depression in the &round); Cavey v. Cincinnati, 12 Ohio C.C. (N.S.)
285, 22 Ohio C.D. 397 (1909), aff'd without opinion, 85 Ohio St. 450, 98 N.E.
1121 (1911) (sidewalk was so near an unguarded retaining wall that the
city was liable for damages sustained when a pedestrian fell over the wall);
Sidney v. Schmidt, 14 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 417, 23 Ohio C.D. 128 (1910) (city
liable to pedestrian who tripped on loose stones and fell over culvert which
was not equipped with guard rails); Barnesville v. Ward, 85 Ohio St. 1, 96
N.E. 937 (1911) (liability imposed where a low wire was strung between
sidewalk and parkway running over to the curb); McCurdy v. Newark, 10
Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 526, 25 Ohio Dec. 666 (1910) (similar situation to Barnes-
ville case but liability not imposed); other cases in point are: Kelley v. Co-
lumbus, 41 Ohio St. 263 (1884); Cleveland v. Parschem, 9 Ohio L. Abs. 694
(1931); Hubler v. Dayton, 26 Ohio L. Abs. 679 (1938). The problem is
discussed by Judge William L. Hart, now on the Ohio Supreme Court, in
Review of Ohio Case Law for 1937, 10 Ohio Op. 169 (1937).
c1 Smith v. Cuyahoga Falls, 73 Ohio App. 22, 53 N.E. 2d 670 (1943)
(water and ice); McCave v. Canton, 140 Ohio St. 150, 42 N.E. 2d 762 (1942)
(city not liable for the natural accumulations of snow and ice); Burling-
hauser v. Laisy, 11 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 348, 22 Ohio Dec. 238 (1911); Norwalk
v. Tuttle, 73 Ohio St. 242, 76 N.E. 617 (1906); Stamberger v. Cleveland, 22
Ohio C.C. 65, 12 Ohio C.D. 42 (1901); Chase v. Cleveland, 44 Ohio St. 505, 9
N.E. 225 (1886); Cincinnati v. Grebner, 7 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 11, 15 Ohio C.D
700 (1904) (liability was imposed where ice resulted from a broken wate
main).
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planning of a sidewalk, 2 the bridge itself may be so constructed as
to constitute a nuisance. Thus, a narrow bridge, so located that a
concrete pilaster separating the vehicular and pedestrian traffic is
situated approximately in the middle of one of the road's traffic
lanes, is a nuisance and the city is liable for resulting damages.63
Similarly, a bridge might become a nuisance by functional obso-
lescence. Thus, liability was imposed where a boy, riding atop some
beer cases on a truck, was killed when he struck his head against
the lower rail of an overhead railroad bridge.6 4 The bridge, adequate
when built, became a nuisance by virtue of the increased size of
vehicles. Where the bridge is in such a state of disrepair as to
collapse when a pedestrian walks thereon, recovery is permitted. 5
Failure to erect guard rails along a bridge or its approaches may
subject the city to liability66 although there is no specific mention
of guard rails in connection with the duties of the municipality.6 7
Sewers
Although Ohio General Ohio Section 3714 does not specifically
provide that sewers shall be kept open, in repair, and free from
nuisance, it is clear that liability will be imposed if they are not so
maintained. Responsibility can be predicated on the theory that
the defect of the sewer causes a nuisance in the street, s that the
sewer is an aqueduct within the express provisions of the statute,6 9
or that the municipality is liable for negligence in performing the
proprietary function of maintaining sewers."0 Except for the actual
construction of a sewer which is considered a governmental func-
tion,' 1 there is ample basis for holding the city responsible for losses
arising out of its lack of ordinary care with respect to sewers.
62 Circleville v. Sohn, 59 Ohio St. 285, 52 N.E. 788 (1898).
63 Kocher v. Barberton, 140 Ohio St. 240, 42 N.E. 2d 977 (1942); Spring-
field v. McDaniel, 45 Ohio App. 87, 186 N.E. 741 (1932); But the county
is not liable for damages resulting from a narrow bridge. Allison v. Com-
missioners of Crawford County, 19 Ohio L. Abs. 74 (1935).4 Yackee v. Napoleon, 135 Ohio St. 344, 21 N.E. 2d 111 (1939).
65Lengyel v. Brandmiller, 139 Ohio St. 478, 40 N.E. 2d 909 (1942).
66 Strobel v. Cincinnati, 32 Ohio App. 333, 168 N.E. 543 (1929) (verdict
for the city was permitted to stand in spite of prejudicial instructons be-
cause plaintiff failed to show proximate cause and directed verdict would
have been proper); Commissioners v. Shurts, 10 Ohio App. 219 (1918);
Boyd v. Cambridge, 4 Ohio C.C. 519, 2 Ohio C.D. 683 (1890).
67 The duty is specifically imposed on the county. Ohio Gen. Code
§7563 (1938).
68 Portsmouth v. Mitchell Co., 113 Ohio St. 250, 148 N.E. 846 (1925).
69 Zolg v. Deer Park, 18 Ohio Op. 131, 5 Ohio Supp. 193 (1944).
70 Portsmouth v. Mitchell Co., supra note 68.
71 Hutchinson v. Lakewood, 125 Ohio St. 100, 180 N.E. 643 (1932);
Bluhm v. Blanck and Gargaro, Inc., 62 Ohio App. 451, 24 N.E. 2d 615 (1939).
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Parks, Ponds and Swimming Pools
The city is liable for nuisance in and around public parks,
ponds or swimming pools under the mandatory provisions of Ohio
General Code Section 3714. Such facilities are included within the
term "public grounds" which specifically must be kept nuisance free.
The decisions as to parks apparently are not uniform. In one case
recovery was denied to a child injured from a defective horizontal
bar, the court implying, if not specifically asserting, that such de-
fective equipment is not a nuisance. The child's father, a non-resi-
dent, had paid the city one dollar for the privilege of using the
playground. The court held that a breach of contract action could
not be brought by the father as next friend of the child because
such a contract (to maintain the equipment in a safe condition),
entered into by the city, is ultra vires and unenforceable.72 A con-
trary result had been reached in another case in which the city
was held liable for injuries resulting from a defective slide.73 The
court simply held that the slide in that condition was a public
nuisance and the city was liable for not abating it.7 1 Recovery was
permitted against a city for allowing corrugated steel pipes to be
piled up in a park in such a manner that a young boy was killed
while playing on them.75 Permitting an unexploded fireworks bomb
to be left in a park has been held to render the city liable on the
basis of a public nuisance when the bomb was found and ex-
ploded.78 Similarly, the exhibition of a fireworks display with
bombs of sufficient powder to kill a man may constitute a nuisance
irrespective of the degree of care used.77 A discus, on the other
hand, is said to be not an inherently dangerous instrument; there-
fore keeping one with other playground equipment does not create
liability in an event injury results from its use." Apparently the
more common holding is that a park represents a governmental
function and the city is liable only if a nuisance exists.79 Considera-
72 Thrasher v. Cincinnati, 28 Ohio Op. 97, 13 Ohio Supp. 143 (1944).
73 Schmitt v. Cheviott, 31 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 12 (1933).
74 Ibid.
75 Gottesman v. Cleveland, 142 Ohio St. 410, 52 N.E. 644 (1944).
71 Cleveland v. Ferrando, 114 Ohio St. 207, 150 N.E. 747 (1926). In
Schwarz v. Cincinnati, 55 Ohio App. 123, 9 N.E. 2d 3 (1936), however, lia-
bility was not imposed partly on the ground that no notice was shown,
and so judgment on a verdict for the city was permitted to stand.
77 Harris v. Findlay, 59 Ohio App. 375, 18 N.E. 2d 413 (1938).
78 Aimslee v. Bellevue, 73 Ohio App. 577, 57 N.E. 2d 279 (1943).
79 Cases holding the maintenance of a park to be a governmental func-
tion: Sailor v. Columbus, 23 Ohio L. Abs. 417 (1936); Harris v. Findlay,
supra note 78; Thrasher v. Cincinnati, 28 Ohio Op. 97, 13 Ohio Supp. 143
(1944); Cleveland v. Walker, 52 Ohio App. 477, 3 N.E. 2d 990 (1936). But
see Harff v. Cincinnati, 11 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 41, 25 Ohio Dec. 301 (1911)
(language contra but the assertion unnecessary for the decision). In Gor-
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tions in determining the existence of a nuisance include the prob-
ability or likelihood that the condition or disrepair will inflict dam-
ages on the public in the normal use of the park, and the knowl-
edge and negligence on the part of the municipality in permitting
the dangerous condition to continue.
There are several cases involving the liability of the munici-
pality for injuries sustained at public ponds. Apparently, there is
no duty on the part of the city to construct guard rails or barriers
around such bodies of water even though they are located in public
parks.80 Whether there is a walk around the edge of the water81
or whether the water is on improved or unimproved land 2 makes
no difference. The pond in either case is not a nuisance.2 3 In ac-
cordance with the previously mentioned rule tlbat liability is not
imposed for hazards resulting naturally from the elements, 84 a mu-
nicipality is not responsible for drownings resulting from the break-
ing of ice made unsafe by warm weather.8
Misleading markings as to the depth of the water near diving
boards in a municipal swimming pool may be the basis for liability
on a nuisance theory,8 6 but the statute is strictly construed and
more than negligence must be shown. 7 The absence of markings,
on the other hand, does not constitute a nuisance if the general
layout of the pool is such that one would ordinarily expect the
shallow water at that particular place.8  Again, the test seems to
such v. Springfield, 43 Ohio L. Abs. 83, 61 N.E. 2d 898 (1945), it was held
that maintenance of a golf course and a club house within a public park
constituted a proprietary function of the government. It was not asserted
that the park itself was a proprietary function.
80 Sailor v. Columbus, 23 Ohio L. Abs. 417 (1936).
81 Ibid.
82 Sailor v. Columbus, supra note 80; Toledo v. Cummings, 121 Ohio St.
37, 166 N.E. 897 (1929).
82 Sailor v. Columbus, supra note 80; Toledo v. Cummings, supra note
82.
84 See note 61 supra.
85 Cleveland v. Walker, 52 Ohio App. 477, 3 N.E. 2d 990 (1936).
86 Sansone v. Cleveland, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 246 (1940). The depth of the
water was marked as ten feet, but where deceased struck bottom in diving
off a 15 ft. diving board, the water was only four and one-half feet deep.
S Selden v. Cuyahoga Falls, 132 Ohio St. 223, 6 N.E. 2d 976 (1937).
s8 Selden v. Cuyahoga Falls, supra note 87. (A float with a diving
board about four feet above the water was located in the center of the pool
where the water was five feet deep. A low board from one to two feet
above the water was located along the side of the pool where the water
was only three feet deep. The court seemed to think that anybody would
expect the water to be shallow under this low board which would be for
children's use, but from which plaintiff attempted a jack-knife dive.)
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be the likelihood of endangering the public in the ordinary use of
the pool.8 9
Blasting
Governmental liability for damages resulting from blasting is
imposed in accordance with the principles applicable to tort liability
generally. If the blasting is being conducted in the furtherance
of a proprietary function, liability is imposed for negligence,90 but
if the work being performed is done in the furtherance of a govern-
mental function, the municipality is accorded immunity.9 1 How-
ever, the blasting may be conducted in such a manner as to con-
stitute a nuisance, in which case liability is imposed.92 Blasting is
not a nuisance per se,93 however, and therefore sufficient facts must
be alleged to show nuisance. It has been suggested that blasting
of a sufficient intensity to damage nearby property is itself enough
to constitute such nuisance.94 Since only municipalities are cov-
ered by statute which makes liability depend on nuisance,95 re-
covery against other governmental units engaged in blasting activi-
ties might not be allowed unless the unit were engaged in the per-
formance of a proprietary function.
Miscellany
A city is not liable for the negligent treating of a patient at a
city hospital, 6 but it may be liable for the wrongful revocation of
a permit to remove a building.97 In the absence of a statute as at
present, the municipality is not responsible for damages caused by
mobs or riots. The preservation of the peace is a governmental
89 Selden v. Cuyahoga Falls, 132 Ohio St. 223, 6 N.E. 2d 976 (1937);
Sansone v. Cleveland, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 246 (1940).
90Tiffin v. McCormack, 34 Ohio St. 638, 32 Am. Rep. 408 (1878);
Louden v. Cincinnati, 90 Ohio St. 144, 106 N.E. 970 (1914).
"' Snider v. Youngstown, 27 Ohio L. Abs. 231 (1938); Hutchinson v.
Lakewood, 125 Ohio St. 100, 180 N.E. 643 (1932). But see Chapman v.
Lepotsky, 23 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 90, 34 Ohio C.D. 132 (1912) (apparently
contra but the doctrine of nonliability because of the character of the work
was not invoked).
92 Crino v. Campbell, 68 Ohio App. 391, 41 N.E. 2d 583 (1941).
93 Snider v. Youngstown, 27 Ohio L. Abs. 231 (1938); Crino v. Camp-
bell, supra note 92.
94 Crino v. Campbell, 68 Ohio App. 391 at 394, 41 N.E. 2d 583, 585
(1941); Snider v. Youngstown, 2 Ohio L. Abs. 231 (1938).
15 Ohio General Code Section 3714 pertains only to municipalities.
9 6 Lloyd v. Toledo, 42 Ohio App. 36, 180 N.E. 716 (1931).
97 Cleveland v. Lenze, 27 Ohio St. 383 (1875) (The city gave plaintiff
permission to remove his building to another lot because of non-conformity
to fire ordinance. When he got the building to the new location, the permit
was revoked and the plaintiff ordered to tear down the building. Plaintiff
was permitted to recover his damages).
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function and so the city is immune from liability. 8 A city may be
liable for the maintenance of a rifle range on public property al-
though by a proper exercise of the police power it would abate a
nuisance. The maintenance of such a range is contrary to Ohio
General Code Section 12635, and thus it is proper for the jury to de-
cide whether it is a nuisance, and if so, whether such nuisance is the
proximate cause of the injury. 9 From early times the municipality
has been held liable for damages resulting from change of grade.100
Even if no grade has previously been established, the lot owner
may still recover, but his recovery is limited to the difference be-
tween what his damages would have been if a reasonable grade
had been established, and what they are under the unreasonable
grade as established.1 1 The city is not liable, however, for dam-
ages caused by increased flow of water resulting from private im-
provement of property within the area of natural drainage. 10 2
Motor Vehicles
Ohio General Code Section 3714-11°3 provides in substance that
9s Western College v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375 (1861); Robinson v.
Greenville, 42 Ohio St. 625, 51 Am. Rep. 857 (1885).
99 Gaines v. Wyoming, 147 Ohio St. 491, 72 N.E. 2d 369 (1947). Shevetz
v. Campbell, 69 Ohio App. 479, 44 N.E. 2d 141 (1940) (City not liable unless
the defect was the proximate cause of the injury).
100 Goodloe v. Cincinnati, 4 Ohio 500 (1831); McCombs v. Akron, 15
Ohio 474 (1846), aff'd, 18 Ohio 229 (1849); Metcalf v. Elyria, 14 Ohio C.C.
(N.S.) 465, 23 Ohio C.D. 151 (1910), afj'd, 84 Ohio St. 501 (1911); Johns v.
Cincinnati, 45 Ohio St. 278, 12 N.E. 801 (1887).
101 Hurst v. Akron, 23 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 591, 34 Ohio C.D. 416 (1912);
Middletown v. Doty, 6 Ohio App. 333, 28 Ohio C.A. 465 (1917) (No recovery
permitted because it was not shown the city established an unreasonable
grade).
102 Hamilton v. Ashbrook, 62 Ohio St. 511, 57 N.E. 239 (1900); Spring-
field v. Spence, 39 Ohio St. 665 (1883). But the city is liable for the over-
flow of surface water caused by public construction. Andrews v. George-
town, 34 Ohio App. 79, 170 N.E. 450 (1929); Toledo v. Lewis, 32 Ohio L.
Bull. 378 (1894), and 17 Ohio C.C. 588, 9 Ohio C.D. 451 (1895); McBride v.
Akron, 12 Ohio C.C. 610, 6 Ohio C.D. 739 (1894).
103 The text of OHio GEN. CODE §3714-1 (1938) is as follows:
Every municipal corporation shall be liable in damages for
injury or loss to persons or property and for death by wrongful
act caused by the negligence of its officers, agents or servants
while engaged in the operation of any vehicles upon the public
highways of this state under the same rules and subject to the
same limitations as apply to private corporation for profit but
only when such officer, agent or servant is engaged upon the
business of the municipal corporation.
Provided, however, that the defense that the officer, agent,
or servant of the municipality was engaged in performing a gov-
ernnlental function, shall be a full defense as to negligence of
members of the police department engaged in police duties, and
as to the negligence of members of the fire department while en-
gaged in duty at a fire or while proceeding toward a place where
a fire is in progress or is believed to be in progress or in answer-
ing any other emergency alarm. And provided, further, that a
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the municipality will be liable in damages to the same extent as pri-
vate individuals and corporations for injuries br losses caused by the
negligence of its officers, agents, or servants in operating motor
vehicles upon the public highways. This statute was enacted in
1933 presumably to effect a change in the law as applied in the
Wooster and Piqua cases.104 Under this statute, apparently, recovery
is permitted if an agent of the city is driving on city business, even
his own private car,105 and negligently causes loss or injuries to
somebody else. The governmental-proprietary distinction is no
longer of any moment where a highway tort is concerned except in
the two cases specifically provided for in the statute. The second
paragraph of Ohio General Code Section 3714-1 provides that the
defense of performing a governmental function is a complete defense
where the tort occurs while the police are engaged in police duties
and the firemen are going to a fire or answering an emergency call.
It is also provided that individual members of the police and fire -de-
partments are not personally liable for losses occasioned by the
operation of motor vehicles while they are engaged in governmental
duties.08 Thus one might find himself without any recourse at all,
when injured by wrongful act of a public employee. Liability is
fireman shall not be personally liable for damages for injury or
loss to persons or property and for death caused while engaged
in the operation of a motor vehicle in the performance of a gov-
ernmental function and provided further that a policeman shall
not be personally liable for damages for injury or loss to persons
or property and for death caused while engaged in the operation
of a motor vehicle while responding to an emergency call.
104 Wooster v. Arbenz, 116 Ohio St. 281, 156 N.E. 210 (1927) (no lia-
bility for negligent operation of repair truck); Thompson v. Piqua, 13 Ohio
L. Abs. 548 (1932) (no liability for negligent operation of truck engaged in
hauling material for street repair); see also Matcoski v. Canton, 54 Ohio
App. 234, 237, 6 N.E. 2d 795, 797 (1935). r
The 1933 act (115 Ohio Laws 206) did not exempt policemen and fire-
men from personal liability, but the provisions as to municipal liability
and immunity were the same as in the present statute. In 1935 (116 Ohio
Laws 507) the statute was amended by adding the provisions exempting
firemen from personal liability in those situations where the municipality
was not liable; and in 1937 (117 Ohio Laws 482) a similar provision was
added exempting policemen from personal liability.
105 1934 Ops. AT'y GEN. (Ohio) No. 2184.
'01 McDermott v. Irwin, 148 Ohio St. 67, 73 N.E. 2d 86 (1947) held it
was complete defense in an action against the policeman that at the time
of the accident he was answering an emergency call.
In an action against the city, it was held that a fire truck, enroute to
an engine house other than the one at which it was usually stationed, to
replace a fire truck called to a fire, is answering an emergency call as con-
templated in Section 3714-1, and a person injured in a collision with such
fire truck cannot hold the city liable. Staudenheimer v. Newark, 62 Ohio
App. 255, 23 N.E. 2d 845 (1939); accord, 1942 Ops. ATT'y GN. (Ohio) No.
5302.
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imposed for all other negligent operation of motor vehicles engaged
to carrying on municipal business."0 7
Notice Requirement
In order to hold a municipal or other local governmental unit
liable for failure to abate a nuisance or keep in repair, it must be
shown that the public body had notice of the defect or disrepair. 08
Either actual or constructive notice is sufficient.109 If notice to the
public unit is predicated upon notice to an agent, it is necessary to
show that the agent was within the scope of his authority, and
that it was his duty to receive such notice at the time he acquired
the information. 110 Notice to a policeman is ordinarily not sufficient
even though a rule of the police department requires the police
officer to report such defects."' Notice of a general defect does
not constitute notice of a particular one unless they are of the same
general character or the latter is a concomitant of the former.112
If the defect is in the original construction, or if the local govern-
ment has actively caused the nuisance, liability is imposed irrespec-
tive of notice. 13 When with reasonable diligence, the governmental
unit might have discovered the defective condition, it is held liable,
regardless of actual notice. Thus, if the defect or disrepair has ex-
isted for a long time, and is not latent, liability may be imposed;' 4
107 OHIo GEN. CODE §3714-1 (1938), for text see note 103 supra.
108 Bello v. Cleveland, 106 Ohio St. 94, 138 N.E. 526 (1922); Grove-
port v. Bradfield, 2 Ohio C.C. 145, 1 Ohio C.D. 411 (1887), aff'd, 30 Ohio
L. Bull. 351 (1893).
109 Cases cited note 108 supra; Guernsey County Commissioners v.
Black, 25 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 415, 24 Ohio C.D. 164 (1911), aff'd, 88 Ohio St.
587 (1913).
110 Cleveland v. Payne, 72 Ohio St. 347, 352, 74 N.E. 177, 178 (1905).
"' Cleveland v. Payne, 72 Ohio St. 347, 74 N.E. 177 (1905); Columbus v.
Penrod, 73 Ohio St. 209, 213, 76 N.E. 826 (1906). Rule recognized in 1945
Ops. ATT'Y GEN. (Ohio) No. 361.
112 Shelby v. Clagett, 46 Ohio St. 549, 22 N.E. 407 (1889); Winkler v.
Columbus, 48 Ohio L. Abs. 161, 163, 164, 71 N.E. 2d 729, 731 (1947), reversed
on grounds of contributory negligence, 149 Ohio St. 45, 36 Ohio Op. 367
(1948).
13 Cloud v. City of Fremont, 72 Ohio App. 193, 51 N.E. 2d 39 (1943);
Harris v. Findlay, 59 Ohio App. 375, 18 N.E. 2d 413 (1938); Hewitt v. Cleve-
land, 21 Ohio C.C. 505, 11 Ohio C.D. 710 (1901), reversed, 67 Ohio St. 534
(1902); Gable v. Toledo, 16 Ohio C.C. 515, 9 Ohio C.D. 63 (1895); Alliance
v. Campbell, 17 Ohio C.C. 595, 6 Ohio C.D. 762 (1895), aff'd, 53 Ohio St. 650,
44 N.E. 1132 (1895); Middleport v. Taylor, 2 Ohio C.C. 366, 369, 1 Ohio C.D.
534 (1887); Circleville v. Neuding, 41 Ohio St. 465 (1885).
114 Wiest v. Cincinnati, 2 Ohio L. Abs. 617 (1924); Cincinnati v. Arm-
strong, 14 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 343, 23 Ohio C.D. 414 (1911), aff'd 88 Ohio St.
568 (1913); Toledo v. Radbone, 3 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 382, 13 Ohio C.D. 268
(1901), afi'd, 68 Ohio St. 687 (1903); Cincinnati v. Frazier, 18 Ohio C.C.
50, 9 Ohio C.D. 487 (1899), aff'd, 19 Ohio C.C. 604, 10 Ohio C.D. 524 (1899).
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otherwise if the condition has existed for a very brief time.115 In
doubtful cases where the type of defect known to the municipality
is in dispute, or where the defect has existed for an intermediate
period, the question of notice is a matter of fact to be resolved by
the jury.116 Public ways and grounds are usually not in such ex-
clusive control of the governmental unit that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur may be applied.1 7 Thus, the simple showing of a
condition such as a misplaced manhole cover is not sufficient to
shift the burden of going forward from the plaintiff. Instead,
some fault of the defendant must be shown in the presentation of
the plaintiff's case." 8 Furthermore, the public body is given a rea-
sonable time to repair the defect after it receives notice thereof." 9
The requirement of notice is maintained even in cases of nuisance
per se, but a petition is not demurrable when it alleges notice even
though the supporting facts seem to negative it. 20 On the other
hand, however, a verdict for the defendant is permitted to stand if
the fact of notice is in dispute and it is reasonable to conclude the
jury resolved the fact against the plaintiff.'2 1 The notice require-
ment may be more easily understood if it is remembered that lia-
bility is predicated on fault and there can be no fault unless the
governmental unit knew or should have known of the particular
defect or dangerous condition which it should have corrected. Such
a showing of notice is a prerequisite of plaintiff's case.
Conditions Precedent to Recovery
In many states the municipality has power to attach conditions
precedent before liability is imposed. 22 A contrary result prevails
in Ohio. In Wilson v. East Cleveland,12 3 the defense was interposed
that the plaintiff had not filed notice of her claim with the city
commission within 30 days after the accident in accordance with
11 McCave v. Canton, 140 Ohio St. 150, 155-6, 42 N.E. 2d 762, 765, 766
(1942); Leipsic v. Gerdeman, 68 Ohio St. 1, 67 N.E. 87 (1903).
"6 Winkler v. Columbus, 48 Ohio L. Abs. 161, 71 N.E. 2d 729 (1947);
reversed on grounds of contributory negligence, 149 Ohio St. 39, 36 Ohio
Op. 364 (1948); Kittredge v. Cincinnati, 6 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 646, 18 Ohio
C.D. 100 (1905).
7 Cleveland v. Pine, 123 Ohio St. 578, 176 N.E. 229 (1931); Cleveland
v. Amato, 123 Ohio St. 575, 176 N.E. 227 (1931).
118 Note 117, supra.
119 Kittredge v. Cincinnati, 6 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 646, 647, 18 Ohio C.D.
100 (1905); Schneider v. Cincinnati, 4 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 57, 16 Ohio Dec.
(N.P.) 206 (1905); McGovern v. Mt. Vernon, 22 Ohio L. Bull. 363 (1889).
12o Cleveland v. Ferrando, 114 Ohio St. 207, 150 N.E. 747 (1926).
121 Schwarz v. Cincinnati, 55 Ohio App. 123, 9 N.E. 2d 3 (1936).
122Note, 11 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 113 (1937). The problem is further
discussed in Shroeder, Administration of Municipal Tort Liability in Cleve-
land, infra p. 412.
123121 Ohio St. 253, 167 N.E. 892 (1929).
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a provision of the city charter. The court held that the reason-
ableness of the condition was not in issue, but rather the power of
the municipality to attach any condition at all. The court then
asserted that the duty to keep the streets and public grounds open
and free from nuisance was imposed by state law and only the state
could relieve any of the local governments from any of the burdens
incident thereto. Inherent in the decision is the idea that the charter
provision qualified the right and not merely modified the remedy.
The decision is apparently based on the proposition that general
laws imposing duties on local subdivisions in relation to highways
and public grounds constitute an exercise of the police power su-
perior to any local regulations and are not included within the
grant of home rule powers.1 2' Hence the charter provision requir-
ing notice to be filed within thirty days was held unconstitutional
since it was in conflict with state law."1
Defenses
Contributory negligence by the plaintiff will bar recovery in
nuisance actions against the municipality under Ohio General Code
Section 3714 where the alleged nuisance is based on negligence of
the municipality. 2 If the supposed nuisance is based on an inher-
ently dangerous instrumentality or the commission of an unlawful
act so as to constitute an absolute nuisance, certain types of con-
tributory negligence may still constitute a defense. Mere negligence
in failure to discover the danger and avoid it should not preclude
recovery, but the type of conduct that is sometimes called assump-
tion of risk or wanton disregard of one's own safety should consti-
tute a good defense. 27 Thus, apparently, the type of contributory
124 OHIo CONSTITUTION, Art. XVIII, §3, providing as follows:
Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers
of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their
limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as
are not in conflict with general laws.
See criticism of the Wilson case in Fordham and Asher, Home Rule
Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 18, 59 (1948).
125 Wilson v. East Cleveland, 121 Ohio St. 253, 167 N.E. 892 (1929).
126 Winkler v. Columbus, 149 Ohio St. 39, 36 Ohio Op. 364 (1948);
Morris v. Cleveland, 44 Ohio L. Abs. 215, 64 N.E. 2d 134 (1945), appeal
dismissed, 146 Ohio St. 186, 32 Ohio Op. 82 (1945); Gottesman v. Cleve-
land, 142 Ohio St. 410, 52 N.E. 2d 644 (1944); Branscomb v. Miamisburg,
32 Ohio L. Abs. 473 (1940); Cincinnati v. Metze, 40 Ohio App. 110, 178
N.E. 222 (1931); Norwalk v. Tuttle, 73 Ohio St. 242, 76 N.E. 617 (1906);
Leber v. Kelley Island Line and Transportation Co., 21 Ohio C.C. 773, 11
Ohio C.D. 568 (1901), aff'd, 67 Ohio St. 553, 67 N.E. 1099 (1903); Schaffier
v. Sandusky, 33 Ohio St. 246 (1877). But the negligence of the driver is
not imputed to the passenger. Becker v. Cincinnati, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 695
(1936); Miller v. Dayton, 70 Ohio App. 173, 41 N.E. 2d (1941).
:127 The general principles concerning the scope of contributory negli-
gence, assumption of risk, and related defenses can be found in PROSSER,
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negligence which is evidenced by the lighting of a'n unexploded fire-
works bomb with full appreciation of the danger would bar recov-
ery.1
28
The fact that the work was done by an independent contractor
may in many cases be used to avoid liability on the part of the em-
ployer. That rule, however, clearly has no application where the
work to be performed is necessarily dangerous or where the obliga-
tion rests upon the employer to keep the subject of the work in a
reasonably safe condition.1 29 Since the duty is directly imposed on
the municipality to keep the streets and public grounds free from
nuisance and since so many of the normal hazards incident to con-
struction or other work would be inherently dangerous if located
in the street or other public grounds, the exception to the inde-
pendent contractor rule would be applicable to at least a large
percentage of cases arising under Ohio General Code Section 3714,
and liability would be imposed. The answer that the city has no
funds is not a defense in Ohio. The Uniform Bond Act makes spe-
cific provision for issuing bonds to satisfy a judgment based on a tort
action. 10
COUNTIES
In the absence of statute, Ohio has for many years followed the
common law rule that a county is not liable for negligence. An
TORTS, 400 et seq., 463 et seq. (1941); Herrig v. Cleveland, 16 Ohio C.C.
(N.S.) 209, 27 Ohio C.D. 643 (1907).
125 Schwartz v. Cincinnati, 55 Ohio App. 123, 9 N.E. 2d 3 (1936). Re-
covery was denied. In affirming judgment for the city, it was held not
error to instruct the jury on contributory negligence without mentioning
the standard of care required of an infant. The unexploded bomb was
apparently a nuisance per se as in Cleveland v. Ferrando, 114 Ohio St.
207, 150 N.E. 747 (1926), where the question of contributory negligence
was not raised. Neither was the question of contributory negligence
raised in the cases of Gaines v. Wyoming, 147 Ohio St. 491, 72 N.E. 2d 369
(1947) and Harris v. Findlay, 59 Ohio App. 375, 18 N.E. 2d 413 (1938).
129 Harris v. Findlay, 59 Ohio App. 375, 18 N.E. 2d 413 (1938); Circle-
ville v. Neuding, 41 Ohio St. 465, 13 Ohio L. Bull. 378 (1885); Tiffin v.
McCormack, 34 Ohio St. 638 (1878). Both the municipality and the inde-
pendent contractor may be enjoined from permitting a nuisance. Bed-
ford v. Cleveland Heights, 18 Ohio Op. 319 (1939) (city garbage used to
maintain hog farm).
'10 OHio GEN. CODE §2293-3 (1937) ; see also Shelby v. Clagett, 46 Ohio
St. 549, 22 N.E. 407 (1889). In this case the cost of repairs could have been
charged to the abutting owner. State ex rel. Turner v. City of Bremen, 117
Ohio St. 186, 158 N.E. 6 (1927); 118 Ohio St. 639, 163 N.E. 302 (1928)
(Mandamus will lie against the city to compel payment of a judgment);
accord, State ex rel. Public Service Co. v. Alliance, 52 Ohio App. 252, 3
N.E. 2d 698 (1935); State ex rel Hagenmeyer v. Pemberville, 38 Ohio App.
162, 175 N.E. 890 (1931). But mandamus will not lie to compel an act
prohibited by statute. Fostoria v. State ex rel Binley, 125 Ohio St. 1,
180 N.E. 371 (1932).
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early holding that the county commissioners were liable in their
corporate capacity when the county was at fault' 31 was overruled
in 1857,132 and since that time the doctrine has prevailed. The rea-
son for the rule is that the county is considered a subdivision of the
state, concerned with general matters, and partaking of the sover-
eign immunity. 1'3 3 If the county has benefited from the wrongful
act, however, as it would in cases of patent infringement and negli-
gent appropriation of another's property for the use of the county,
then the immunity is not accorded. 3 1 It would seem that liability
on the part of the county would usually result from statute.
Roads and Bridges
Ohio General Code Section 2408 provides in part as follows:
... The Board shall be liable in its official capacity for
damages received by reason of its negligence or carelessness
by not keeping any such road or bridge in proper repair,
and shall demand and receive, by suit or otherwise, any
real estate or interest therein, legal or equitable, belonging
to the county or any money or other property due the
county....
This statute is a delegation of duties to county commissioners
similar to the duties delegated to a municipal governing body under
Ohio General Code Section 3714.135 It will be noticed, however, that
the liabilities and duties imposed are different. The municipality is
required to keep the streets open, in repair, and free from nuisance,
whereas the county is liable only when the road or bridge is not
kept in repair.136
131 Commissioners of Brown County v. Butt, 2 Ohio 349 (1826).
132 Hamilton County v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109 (1857).
133Ibid.
13 4 May v. Logan County, 30 Fed. 250 (N.D. Ohio 1887) (patent in-
fringement); Painter v. Napoleon Twp., 156 Fed. 289 (N.D. Ohio 1907)
(trustee in bankruptcy can recover preferential payment from Township
Board, but no fraudulent payment was "found" in this case); Painter v.
Napoleon Twp., 190 Fed. 637 (N.D. Ohio 1910).
135 See note 23 supra for text of the statute.
N6 Milner v. County Commissioners, 14 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 141, 28 Ohio
Dec. 462 (1913). The conflicting duties- are recognized in cases concerning
bridges on county or state roads located within the municipality. Thus, in
Youngstown v. Sturgess, 102 Ohio St. 480, 132 N.E. 17 (1921), the liability
of the municipality for nuisance and of the county for failure to repair the
bridge was recognized; accord, Youngstown v. Bradlyn, 123 Ohio St. 392,
175 N.E. 603 (1931); Mooney v. St. Marys, 15 Ohio C.C. 446, 8 Ohio C.D.
341 (1897); Newark v. McDowell, 16 Ohio C.C. 556, 9 Ohio C.D. 260 (1897);
cf., Piqua v. Geist, 59 Ohio St. 163, 52 N.E. 124 (1898) (holding that there
was no duty on the county to repair the bridge which was within a
municipality but not on roads constituting a part of the county or state
system); Brink -- '1olumbus, 37 Ohio L. Bull. 22 (1897). City is
not liable for maintenance of a bridge on a county or state road if the
city doesn't receive part of the bridge fund. Other cases involving the
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The Ohio courts adhere to the questionable rule that statutes
in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed and at
times have carried the rule to seemingly ridiculous extremes. Lia-
bility had been denied, for example, because it was not shown that
a guard rail previously existed along the bridge, it being impossible
to "keep in repair" something that never existed. 3 7 Similarly, since
the statute imposed the duty to keep in repair bridges which were
"established"'13 8 by the county, recovery was not allowed for negli-
gence in the maintenance of a bridge "established" by another po-
litical unit and then turned over to the county. 3 9 Since these cases
were decided, however, it has been held that liability could be
predicated on the defective construction of the road originally and
need not be confined to deterioration, 40 and that liability could be
imposed for negligence in the repair of a former national road
which has been turned over to the exclusive control of the
county.14 1 This is not to say that the strict construction rule has
been abandoned. Many examples of its application can be found
in recent cases. Liability, for example, is not imposed for main-
taining a nuisance,4-2 for blockading a road so that a firetruck can-
not reach burning premises,'4 or for failure to maintain a road
that is within the corporate limits of a municipality.'"
liability of both the county and municipality can be found infra note 148.
The question of participation in the bridge fund is no longer significant
since such fund is now nondxistent, 1945 Ops. ATr'y GEN. (Ohio) No. 243.
13 Milner v. County Commissioners, 14 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 141, 28 Ohio
Dec. 462 (1913).
"Is Omo GEN. CODE §2408 (1937).
1-39 Yunker v. Commissioners, 11 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 527, 21 Ohio C.D.
552 (1907).
14o Harris v. Ake, 252 Fed. 884 (N.D. Ohio 1917).
'41 Black v. Commissioners, 13 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 252, 21 Ohio C.D. 659
(1909), aff'd, 88 Ohio St. 587, 11 Ohio L. Rep. 62 (1913).
142 Spronk v. Campbell, 17 Ohio Op. 540, 5 Ohio Supp. 238 (1940)
(Sand truck parked on county road during hours of darkness without
lights); Day- v. Manrod, 29 Ohio Op. 298, 13 Ohio Supp. 83 (1942) (No
liability where truck connected with air compressor used to repair culvert
blocked the road).
43Sheley v. Swing, 13 Ohio Op. 434, 1 Ohio Supp. 142 (1938), aff'd,
65 Ohio App. 109, 15 Ohio Op. 381 (1939).
144Sroka v. Green Cab Co., 35 Ohio App. 438, 172 N.E. 531 (1929),
dismissed, 122 Ohio St. 45, 170 N.E. 637 (1930). Other cases in which lia-
bility of the county has been denied include: Bellard v. Commissioners,
31 Ohio App. 224, 167 N.E. 404 (1928) (no liability of county for state
road, but found here it was still a county road); Daus v. Commissioners,
6 Ohio L. Abs. 418 (1927) (liability does not extend to rock ledge upon
which abutment of bridge rests); Weiner v. Phillips, 103 Ohio St. 249,
133 N.E. 67 (1921) (no liability of county for highway under the exclu-
give control and jurisdiction of the state); Ebert v. Commissioners, 75
Ohio St. 474, 80 N.E. 5 (1907) (no liability for damages as a result of a
horse taking fright at stones collected along the roadside). Compare
1948]
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The roads included within the purview of Ohio General Code
Section 2408 probably comprise all roads under the jurisdiction of
the county.145 An important element in determining county liability
for road defects, as in the case of city liability for street defects,
is the likelihood of endangering the general public in the ordinary
use of the highway. Of course, in addition to the element of
danger, there must be a statutory duty imposed on the county. In
interpreting this statutory duty the courts are likely to restrict the
meaning of the terms. The duty has been held to exist, however,
where the defect was on the unimproved instead of the improved
portion of the highway, 4 e where constructive notice rather than
actual notice was charged,'. 7 and where the territory within which
the bridge was located was annexed by a municipality.14 8
Statutes specifically impose the duty of erecting guard rails or
hedge fences at the ends of designated bridges, culverts, viaducts
and wash banks. 9 Here again the statutes are strictly construed
before liability is imposed and no duty rests on the commissioners
to install guard rails at other than the specified places.8 0 If how-
Bales v. Commissioners, 30 Ohio App. 249, 164 N.E. 791 (1928); Commis-
sioners v. Marietta Transfer and Storage Co., 75 Ohio St. 244, 79 N.E. 237
(1906) (no liability for negligence in the operation of a free ferry in lieu
of a bridge); Johnson v. Grunkenmeyer, 8 Ohio N.P. 274, 11 Ohio Dec.
412 (1901) (not liable for failure to keep sidewalk in repair); Commis-
sioners v. Brady, 61 Ohio St. 174, 55 N.E. 173 (1899) (county not liable when
drawbridge constructed on defective model or mechanism); Commissioners
v. Coffman, 60 Ohio St. 527, 54 N.E. 1054 (1899) (no liability when acci-
dent caused by an unusual use of the bridge even though it is in a state
of disrepair).
145 Whitney v. Niehaus, 4 Ohio App. 208, 21 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 273
(1915), motion denied, 13 Ohio L. Rep. 76 (1915). Compare Smith v. Com-
missioners, 10 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 115, 19 Ohio C.D. 610 (1905), aff'd, 73 Ohio
St. 434 (1906) (holding that the duty of keeping ordinary county roads
in repair is not imposed on the commissioners.)
146 Starling v. Commissioners, 53 Ohio App. 293, 4 N.E. 2d 921 (1935);
Stuart v. Commissioners, 30 Ohio App. 283, 165 N.E. 53 (1928); Guernsey
County Commissioners v. Black, 25 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 415, 24 Ohio C.D. 164
(1911), aff'd, 88 Ohio St. 587 (1913).
147 Guernsey County Commissioners v. Black, supra note 146; Starling
v. Commissioners, supra note 146.
148 Interurban Ry. and Terminal Co. v. Cincinnati, 94 Ohio St. 269,
114 N.E. 258 (1916). Ohio General Code Section 2421 is in point. Both
county and city may be liable. Lengyel v. Brandmiller, 130 Ohio St. 478,
40 N.E. 2d 909 (1942); 1945 Ops. ATT'Y GE. (Ohio) No. 243 asserting that
the maintenance and repair of bridges erected on state and county highways
within municipalities is a joint obligation. Other cases involving the lia-
bility of both the county and municipality can be found supra note 136.
149 Omio GEN. CODE §§7563, 7564 and 7565 (1938).
3 50 Walthall v. Commissioners, 18 Ohio L. Abs. 360 (1934) (no liability
when car crashed beyond the point where guard rails were required);
Riley v. Commissioners, 109 Ohio St. 29, 141 N.E. 832 (1923) (pipe under
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ever, a guard rail has already been established at some other than
the designated places, then liability can probably be imposed under
Ohio General Code Section 2408 for failure to keep it in repair.'5 In
order to permit recovery for failure to erect guard rails, it is not
necessary to show that the rails would have actually prevented the
vehicle from going over the side, but it is sufficient to show that
they would have prevented the accident by warning the motor-
ist.15 2 Concern over the safety of the traveler plus an unwilling-
ness to extend the coverage of the statutes beyond their express
terms are common threads running through the cases.153
Mob Violence
In Ohio, counties are made liable to a certain extent for in-
juries and losses suffered at the hands of a mob. Applicable stat-
utes in part provide:
A collection of people assembled for an unlawful pur-
pose and intending to do damage or injury to anyone, or
pretending to exercise correctional power over other per-
sons by violence and without authority of law, shall be
deemed a 'mob' for the purpose of this chapter.' 5'
A person assaulted and lynched by a mob may recover,
from the county in which such assault is made, a sum not
roadway for drainage not a "culvert"); Kerr v. Bougher, 16 Ohio App.
434 (1922) (no duty to install guard rails along a stone wall more
than eight feet high); Wyandot County v. Boucher, 98 Ohio St. 263, 120
N.E. 700 (1918) (perpendicular means greater than forty-five degrees);
Commissioners of Franklin County v. Darst, 96 Ohio St. 163, 117 N.E. 166
(1917); Commissioners of Franklin County v. Kile, 96 Ohio St. 171, 117
N.E. 178 (1917) (no duty to erect barriers unless the approach is more
than six feet high).
3-1 This was intimated in Milner v. County Commissioners, 14 Ohio
N.P. (N.S.) 141, 28 Ohio Dec. 462 (1913).
152 Harrigan v. Commissioners, 13 Ohio App. 408, 31 Ohio C.A. 449
(1919); Zimmer v. Kennedy, 54 Ohio App. 361, 7 N.E. 2d 574 (1936); Slyder
v. Commissioners, 133 Ohio St. 146, 12 N.E. 2d 407 (1938). The Slyder case
is discussed in 11 Ohio Op. 167 (1938) and 13 Ohio Op. 351 (1938). Re-
covery is denied where insufficiency of the guard rail is not the proximate
cause of the injury. Marsh v. Athens County, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 181 (1928).
'5' Other cases in point involving roads and bridges are: Robinson
v. Swing, 70 Ohio App. 83, 36 N.E. 2d 880 (1939) (county not liable for
failure to repair a road that was established without any affirmative action
by the commissioners); Bales v. Commissioners, 30 Ohio App. 249, 164 N.E.
791 (1928) (recovery could be based on negligently permitting stone and
sand to be piled on the highway). Compare Ebert v. Commissioners, 75
Ohio St. 474, 80 N.E. 5 (1907) (no liability when stones piled along tm
roadside frightened plaintiff's horse); Brownfield v. Clapham, 25 Ohio
C.C. (N.S.) 443, 27 Ohio C.D. 424 (1916) and Gregg v. Clapham, 6 Ohio
App. 363, 28 Ohio C.D. 167 (1917) (county liable where fence wire stretched
across road by contractor); Billings v. Dressler, 5 Ohio N.P. 114, 7 Ohio
Dec. 250 (1898) (county liable for failure to repair bridge approaches.)
154 Onio Gmra. CODE §6278 (1945).
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to exceed five hundred dollars; or, if such injury result
in permanent disability to earn a livelihood by manual
labor, a sum not to exceed five thousand dollars.'
A person suffering death or injury from a mob attempt-
ing to lynch another person shall come within the provi-
sions of this chapter.156
The statutes have been held to be penal in nature and in dero-
gation of the common law, and therefore to be strictly construed.'5"
The earlier and better rule was that they are remedial and there-
fore to be liberally construed.158 Recovery seems to be limited to
injuries received when a mob is engaged in activities directed
toward abusive treatment of some actual or supposed criminal. 15
Either the object of the mob's fury himself or any other person
injured by such mob can recover. 6" If the mob, however, is incited
because of a labor dispute and intent on general lawless uncon-
certed vandalism, without being specifically motivated towards the
punishment of a supposed criminal, no recovery is permitted.'
Similarly, no recovery against the county is allowed where the
mob is the result of an intense communist rally directed toward
155 OHIO GEN. CODE §6281 (1945).
156 OHIo GEN. CODE §6283 (1945).
157 Hammett v. Cook, 42 Ohio App. 167, 182 N.E. 36 (1932); Zmunt v.
Lexa, 37 Ohio App. 479 (1930), aff'd, 123 Ohio St. 510, 176 N.E. 82 (1931).
58 Phillips Sheet and Tin Plate Co. v. Griffith, 98 Ohio St. 73, 120
N.E. 207 (1918); Commissioners v. Beaty, 11 Ohio App. 111, 30 Ohio C.A.
391 (1919), motion denied, 17 Ohio L. Rep. 346, 64 Ohio L. Bull. 445
(1919). These cases have apparently been rejected in favor of the strict
construction rule. Reynolds v. Lathrop, 133 Ohio St. 435, 14 N.E. 2d 599
(1938).
,59 Lexa v. Zmunt, 37 Ohio App. 479, aff'd, 123 Ohio St. 510, 176 N.E. 82
(1931); Reynolds v. Lathrop, 133 Ohio St. 435, 14 N.E. 2d 599 (1938); Ham-
mett v. Cook, 42 Ohio App. 167, 182 N.E. 36 (1932).
160 OHIO GEN. CODE §6283 (1945).
161 Gray v. Gibson, 12 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 673 (1912); Davis v. Com-
missioners, 8 Ohio App. 30, 28 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 145 (1917). Apparently
contra, Commissioners v. Beaty, 11 Ohio App. 111, 30 Ohio C.A. 391 (1919).
It is interesting to note that Judge Vickery who drafted the amendment
(enacted 93 Ohio Laws 161 (1898) ) to the Act of 1896 (92 Ohio Laws
136), and who successfully represented claimant in Caldwell v. Comrais-
sioners, 62 Ohio St. 318, 57 N.E. 50 (1900), attempted to reconcile the
cases by asserting that in the Beaty case the mob was attempting to
exert correctional power over the non-striker for not participating in
the strike. Hammett v. Cook, 42 Ohio App. 167, 182 N.E. 36 (1932).
However, this explanation was apparently without merit and the supreme
court later rejected any such broad definition of "correctional power."
Recovery was denied to a plaintiff where a group of strikers beat him up
under the misapprehension that he was a strike breaker. The ground for
the decision was that the attackers were motivated by personal, selfish
motives and not attempting to administer justice with their own handE
in the interest of the public good. Reynolds v. Lathrop, 133 Ohio St. 435:
14 N.E. 2d 599 (1938).
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general destruction and disorder rather than toward a specific
lynching.10 2 It would seem that the liability of the county for mob
violence is very limited, and that the old-fashioned lynchings,
where irate and misguided citizens seek to expedite punishment by
taking the law into their own hands, are the only kinds of riots
within the purview of the statutes. All types of disturbance do not
qualify.163
Dog Bites
The county in Ohio is made liable by statute for personal in-
juries and losses as a result of dog bites. Ohio General Code Section
5840 provides that the owner of sheep, cattle and other animals may
be compensated from the dog and kennel fund of the county for any
losses resulting from an attack by a dog.164 However, certain con-
ditions precedent concerning the giving of notice and filing of the
claim are established. Recovery is allowed even when the dog's
owner suffers the loss, provided the dog was duly registered and
was destroyed within forty-eight hours after discovery of the in-
jury.165
Similarly, a person injured by a dog, cat, or other animal af-
flicted with rabies, if such injury has caused him to employ medical
or surgical treatment, may recover such expenses from the county.
In this case, an itemized account of the expenses must be presented
at a regular meeting of the county commissioners within four
months after such injury, and here again, apparently, an owner can
recover for injuries inflicted by his own dog.'66
Defense and Recovery
As already indicated, the responsibility of the county in tort
is not great and generally must be predicated on statute. Though
strictly not a matter of defense, the doctrine of strict construction
bars recovery in many cases because the asserted liability is not
162 Hammett v. Cook, 42 Ohio App. 167, 182 N.E. 36 (1932). Apparently,
also, no recovery is permitted against the county where the destruction
is directed towards the property of the individual rather than towards his
person since recovery is allowed only for "lynchings" as defined in the
statute. OHio GEN. CODE §6278 and §6280 (1945). The attack on the home
of a communist leader on March 30, 1948 (Columbus Dispatch, March 31,
1948) in Columbus illustrates violence not covered by the statutes. The
county is the only governmental unit that is liable for mob violence, and
it is liable only for personal injuries or death in accordance with the prin-
ciples discussed.
.63 For comment criticizing this construction see "Liability for Per-
sonal Injuries Airsing Out of Labor Disputes," 5 OHio ST. L.J. 101 (1938);
11 Ohio Bar 675 (1938).
164 OHio GEN. CODE §5840 (1945).
165 OHio GEN. CODE §5841 (1945).
160 Omo GEN. CODE §5851 (1945); 1918 Ops. ATT'y GEN. (Ohio) No. 1657.
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within the literal terms of a statute. In the road and bridge cases,
if the cause of action is clearly within the statute, the county is able
to interpose the usual defensive pleas of contributory negligence
and independent contractor. The rules governing these defenses
are the same as previously discussed in relation to municipalities
and are in accord with general tort law. Lack of funds and a legal
means of procuring them have been stated to constitute a defense
in what appears to be a dictum of a circuit court.16 7
In the mob violence cases, the county does not have any defense
but is liable if a party has been injured by a mob within the scope
of the statute. Similarly, liability is imposed in the dog bite cases
-the county being made responsible for such losses, and the only
question being whether or not the loss falls within the statute. In
the mob violence cases, damages are awarded primarily on the basis
of imposing a penalty on the county for failure to keep law and
order, whereas in the dog bite cases recovery is clearly compensa-
tory and measured by the actual loss incurred.
OTHER LocAL UNITS
The township, like the county, is considered a subdivision of
the state government and is afforded sovereign immunity for negli-
gence except in those instances in which liability is specifically pro-
vided by statute. Ohio General Code Section 3298-17 imposes liabil-
ity on the board of township trustees for damages incurred by rea-
son of the negligence or carelessness of the board in the discharge of
its official duties. Although the statute is couched in broad terms,168
it is clear from its position in the code and manner of enactment
that it imposes liability only for negligence in the performance of
the board's duties in respect to roads.8 9 The rule of strict construc-
tion is likewise applicable here as with other statutes opposed to
the common law. 70 Thus, in order to permit recovery, the petition
must show that the road in question is a township road' 7' and that
the board committed the act while engaged in official dutiesY.7 2 The
167 Commissioners v. Black, 25 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 415, 24 Ohio C.D. 164
(1911), affd, 88 Ohio St. 587, 105 N.E. 767 (1913).
168 OHIO GEN. CODE §3298-17 (1947) provides
Each board of township trustees shall be liable, in its official
capacity for damages received by any person, firm or corporation,
by reason of the negligence or carelessness of said board of trustees
in the discharge of its official duties.
169R ay v. Trustees, 49 Ohio App. 172, 195 N.E. 707 (1934). Liability
was imposed in Gause v. Peeler, 41 Ohio App. 192, 180 N.E. 384 (1931). A
discussion of the scope of the township's liability in relation to roads can
be found in 1939 Ops. ATT'Y. GEN. (Ohio) No. 893.
170 Ray v. Trustees, supra note 169. Washington Twp. v. Rapp, 50 Ohio
App. 1, 197 N.E. 413 (1934).
:17 Burchnell v. Barton, 12 Ohio Op. 3, 2 Ohio Supp. 108 (1938).
172Berry v. Michael, 70 Ohio App. 426, 46 N.E. 2d 621 (1941).
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statute apparently does not cover damages which result from wilful
and wanton acts of the township's agents 7" or damages resulting
from negligence in the operation of fire equipment. 17 4 Liability is
imposed, however, for damages resulting from the negligent opera-
tion of road machinery 7 and for negligence in failure to warn
travelers when the road is under construction.' 6 The Ohio At-
torney General has ruled that the township may purchase liability
or property damage insurance upon township-owned motor ve-
hicles' 7 7 The usual defenses of contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk are available to the trustees.
1 7 8
The immunity of the sovereign, characteristic of the state gov-
ernment and its agencies, does not extend to corporations called
into being by the voluntary action of individuals forming them
for their own advantage, convenience and pleasure. Hence, an agri-
cultural society, although- receiving aid from the county treasury,
is liable for negligence. 79 A board of education, on the other hand,
is considered an agency of the state and carrying on duties for the
general welfare and so is immune from liability for negligence. 180
Similarly a board of health is excused from liability in the absence
of statute.'8 '
The liability of local governments generally for torts inflicted
173 Washington Twp. v. Rapp, 50 Ohio App. 1, 197 N.E. 413 (1934).
171-1933 Ops. ATT'y GEN. (Ohio) No. 180.
175 Ferber v. Trustees, 47 Ohio App. 449, 191 N.E. 444 (1933); 1933
Ops. ATT'y GEN. (Ohio) No. 807.
176 1928 OPs. ATT'Y GEN. (Ohio) No. 3082.
171931 Ops ATT'Y. GEN. (Ohio) No. 2995. This opinion impliedly
overruled a contrary one which apparently was based on the erroneous
assumption that no liability existed. 1928 OPs. ATT'y GEN. (Ohio) No. 2172.
The insurance however, must cover a contingency which if it happened
would create liability or otherwise the purchase of such a policy would
be an illegal expenditure of funds. 1943 Ops. AT'VY GEN. (Ohio) No. 5949.
1
7 8 Aalto v. Bishop, 8 Ohio L. Abs. 563 (1929).
179 Dunn v. Agriculture Society, 46 Ohio St. 93, 18 N.E. 496 (1888).
180 Finch v. Board of Education, 30 Ohio St. 37 (1876); Elias v. Nor-
ton, 53 Ohio App. 38, 4 N.E. 2d 146 (1936) (affirmed the non-liability rule
but stated that a petition which alleged the members of the Board were
individually operating a lunch room in their proprietary capacity stated
a cause of action); Shaw v. Board of Education, 17 Ohio L. Abs. 588
(1934) (no liability for collapse of bleacher seats); Conrad v. Board of
Education, 29 Ohio App. 317, 163 N.E. 567 (1928) (no liability to pupil
injured by buzz saw in manual training class); Board of Education v.
McHenry, 106 Ohio St. 357, 140 N.E. 169 (1922) (not liable for the negligent
extraction of a pupil's tooth); Board of Education v. Volk, 72 Ohio St. 469,
74 N.E. 646 (1905) (not liable for the negligent taking away of lateral
support.)
181 OHIo GEN. CODE §4434 (1945) provides that compensation should
be paid for infected property destroyed by order of the Board of Health.
The rule of strict construction was applied in Clouse v. Coykendall, 29
Ohio C.A. 76 (1918).
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on their employees, now primarily determined by proceedings un-
der the Workmen's Compensation Act, is discussed separately8 2
and therefore is omitted from this article.
APPRAISAL AND SUGGESTION
The foregoing survey of the Ohio law of tort liability of local
governments should make one thing, if nothing else, clear: there is
no definite pattern which may be traced through the cases and
statutes. Instead of a fabric with warp and woof showing a sym-
metry which is pleasing to the eye, one finds a patch work with
occasional glaring inconsistencies.
Let us assume that a sheriff's car, a police cruiser and a fire
truck are returning from the scene of a train wreck. Let us further
assume that the drivers are all negligent and by reason of their
negligence seriously injure persons lawfully on the road. The
county is not liable for the sheriff's tortious conduct because of the
sovereign immunity which it shares with the state.18 3 The city is
not liable for the policeman's negligence since he was in the per-
formance of his duties and the defense of governmental function
prevails. 8 4 The city is liable for the negligence of the fireman be-
cause as to him the governmental function doctrine ceased to con-
stitute a defense when the fireman left the scene of the emer-
gency. 85
The snow falls on the just and the unjust. It accumulates in
hard, slippery bumps on the steps of the courthouse, the city hall
and the building which serves as the headquarters of the municipal
electric and waterworks department. On the same day persons are
injured by falling on the steps of each of these buildings. The county
is not liable to the one injured at the court house on any theory of
nuisance or negligence. 18 6 The city is only liable to the one injured
at the city hall if the snow and ice constituted a nuisance.'87 The
city is liable to the one injured at the electric and water depart-
ment building regardless of nuisance if negligence on the part of
its employees caused the injury, since proprietary functions are
involved. 88
If good reasons could be given for the inconsistent results which
follow in such cases as those mentioned, there would be no occa-
sion for suggesting a change. The reasons which have usually
182 See Comment, Workmen's Compensation For Public Employees in
Ohio, infra p. 508.
183 Supra note 133.
184 Supra note 103.
185 Ibid.
186 Supra notes 132 and 136.
137 Supra notes 23 and 27.
18s Supra note 8.
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been given by the courts for holding various subdivisions not liable
in tort may be reduced to a single proposition: the legislature has
not so provided. The state's own immunity from suit can be re-
moved by legislative enactment.'8 9 Therefore the more questionable
immunity of any of its subdivisions may be removed at any time
and to any extent which seems appropriate to the legislature. Sim-
ilarly the overworked concepts of governmental and proprietary
functions have nothing more substantial to support them than leg-
islative inaction. In the first paragraph of Ohio General Code
Section 3714-1 the distinction between the two types of functions is
abolished insofar as the operation of vehicles on the highways in
behalf of municipal corporations is concerned.1 90 The second para-
graph of the section retains the distinction for certain vehicles
under certain circumstances. If it had not been added, a neat job of
removing an outworn distinction would have been accomplished. 1
When an individual is injured as a result of the negligent or
other wrongful act of a public servant three possibilities are pres-
ent: (1) the injured person may go uncompensated for his injury;
(2) he may be required to look solely to the public employee for
compensation; (3) the public body in behalf of which the employee
acted may be required to make compensation as do other employers,
whether individual or corporate. In actual practice there is fre-
quently little difference in the results whether the first or second
of these possible approaches is taken. The public employee who
might be sued is not necessarily in a financial position to carry the
burden of compensating for the injury. If a judgment against him
will not be satisfied the injured person is in no better position than
if the law permitted no judgment. Some public officers and em-
ployees are required to give bond and those injured by their tortious
acts may have recourse against the bondsmen. 92 Because of the
limited liability under such bonds and because most 'public em-
ployees are not required to give bond, it is safe to say that persons
injured by wrongful acts of public employees will not be adequately
compensated if the employer is given immunity.
If the choice, then, for practical purposes becomes one of leav-
ing the injured person uncompensated in whole or in part or of
placing the loss on the public body the answer would seem to be
easy. The prevalence of insurance of all types, the existence of
Workmen's Compensation funds and many other similar institu-
tions bear witness to the fact that diffusion of loss is highly desir-
189 0IO CoNsT. Art. I, §16.
190 Supra note 103.
19, Ibid.
192Maryland Cas. Co. v. McDiarmid, 116 Ohio St. 576, 157 N.E. 321
(1927); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Samuels, 116 Ohio St. 586,
157 N.E. 325 (1927).
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able. The writer of a recent article on accident liability has stated
the matter succinctly as follows:
Even where individual ruin and its wider consequences
are not threatened, the equitable and wide distribution of
a loss is all to the good, for a man's bottom dollar is his
most valuable dollar, and each dollar added to that has a
decreasing value to him. So that if a loss equals 100, less
social disutility will result from letting one unit of it fall
on each of 100 people than from putting it all on one
person.1 '
It is difficult to believe that there are no better reasons which ac-
count for the fact that we still tolerate a policy of leaving deserv-
ing claimants uncompensated if their injuries are caused by public
servants. Stripped of nonessentials the reasons appear to be either
a nebulous fear of raids on the public treasury or simple inertia.
Studies made in recent years have shed considerable light upon
the tort burden of municipalities.19 The following excerpt is taken
from a report of one of these studies: 195
The fear that the abolition of the tort immunity of
municipal corporations would thrust an unbearable burden
upon small municipalities is one of the chief obstacles in
the way of further extension of liability. Until recently,
no data existed in usable form which would tend either to
prove or to disprove the basis of this fear. Indeed, the
whole matter of tort liability in small towns and cities was
shrouded in utter darkness. Fortunately, this deficiency
has been relieved. The state-wide survey sponsored by
the Bureau of Public Administration at the University of
Virginia' together with several studies of individual cities
in other states2 have provided a basis upon which conclu-
sions concerning the tort liability problems of small mu-
nicipalities may be drawn.
The tort burden of small municipalities has been
greatly exaggerated. Statistics based upon data from 189
municipalities with populations under 100,000 would seem
to prove that the present burden of tort liability upon small
'O3James Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability
Insurance, 57 YAxE L. J. 549, 550 (1948).
'
94 Fuller and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HARV.
L. REV. 437 (1941); David, Public Tort Liability Administration: Basic
Conflicts and Problems, 9 LAw & CONTFMP. PROB. 335 (1942); David and
French, Public Tort Liability Administration, Organization, Methods and
Expense, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 348; Peterson, Government Responsi-
bility for Torts in Minnesota, 26 MINN. L. REV. 293, 480, 700, 854 (1942).
195 Warp, Tort Liability Problems of Small Municipalities, 9 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 363 (1942).
'WARP, MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN VIRGINIA (1941).
2Unpublished studies by Mr. Gus Levy of Austin, Texas, and by Mr.
Mark E. Gallagher of Medford, Massachusetts, both of which were spon-
sored by the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science
Research Council.
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municipalities is insignificant. The statistics are presented
in the following table.'
TABLE I
ANNUAL TORT BURDEN OF SMALL MUNICIPALITIES
1940 No. of Amt. of Aver. Amt. per
Municipality Pop. Awards Awards Award 1,000 Pop.
Austin, Tex. -------- 87,930 13 $ 2,961 $228 $ 34
Roanoke, Va. ------- 69,287 3 292 97 4
Madison, Wis .------- 67,447 - 671 - 10
Medford, Mass .------ 63,083 32 10,205 319 , 162
Lynchburg, Va .----- 44,541 16 2,404 150 54
19 Virginia Cities*__- 273,170 10 2,466 247 9
165 Virginia Towns __ 216,757 6 1,452 242 7
* Not including Roanoke and Lynchburg.
It is readily apparent from these figures that the only
municipality with a sizable burden is the City of Medford,
Massachusetts. And even there the annual burden is less
than one and one-half cents (sic) per inhabitant.4
For the year 1946 the City Attorney of Columbus reported that
the city had paid $4600 to satisfy five judgments for sidewalk de-
fects, $1300 to satisfy a judgment for damages incident to condem-
nation of land for an alley, and $2771.64 to satisfy 58 claims for
personal injuries and property damage, including $273 paid to police
officers for personal property damage.101
For the year 1947 the City Attorney reported payment of a net
total of $9300 to satisfy 8 judgments and $1480.78 to satisfy 60 other
claims.197 The totals for the two years, $8,671 and $10,781 respec-
tively, seem quite small when one recalls that the city of Columbus
has a population of approximately 340,000 and total receipts for the
year 1946 of $18,361,702 and for the year 1947 of $20,117,407.95.198
It is safe to assume that every suggestion made in the past for
relaxing the rule of immunity was met with the prediction that an
unbearable burden would be the result. When the legislature in
1933 abolished the governmental-proprietary distinction for munici-
pal vehicles other than those of the fire and police departments
there was undoubtedly opposition based on fear of financial dis-
The statistics are taken from the studies mentioned in notes 1 and 2,
supra.
4 It is interesting to note further that the burdens of Austin, Texas,
and Lynchburg, Virginia, are high because of the commendable policy of
the city attorneys in those cities of settling all legitimate tort claims rather
than of forcing them into the courts.16 ANNo. REPORTS, Supp. to City Bulletin of Columbus, 1946.
197 The report had not been printed when this article was written.
For comparable statistics in Cleveland, see Schroeder, Administration of
Municipal Tort Liability in Cleveland, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 412 (1948).
198 The city attorney reported that 171 cases were pending as of De-
cember 31, 1947, of which 115 were sewer pollution cases. The income
figures for 1947 were obtained from the City Treasurer's office since the
report had not been published at this writing.
1948]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
aster. How ill founded were any such fears is indicated by (1) the
fact that the statute has not been repealed nor amended in a way
to lessen the municipal liability and (2) the above quoted figures
from the City of Columbus which, although not conclusive, at least
suggest the relative lightness of the burden.
Since liability of municipal corporations has been recognized
in many situations as a result of Ohio General Code Sections 3714
and 3714-1, removing all immunity will not greatly affect them.
Counties are liable at present for damages caused by their failure to
keep roads or bridges in proper repair. 199 It is unlikely that removal
of immunity in other cases would prove too costly to be continued
as a policy.
The New York General Assembly in 1936200 took a long step
toward abolishing the immunity which public bodies had previously
enjoyed. In 1941 after several years of experience the scope of the
statute imposing liability was extended to cover vehicle accidents
on the highways of the state instead of being limited to those occur-
ring on the streets of the municipality. 2 1 The statute makes "every
county, city, town, village and other subdivision" liable for negli-
gence in the operation of vehicles owned by the unit if done in the
scope of employment. There is nothing to indicate that such a law
has imposed intolerable burdens upon the subdivisions of New
York.
The leading exponent of the theory that sovereign immunity
from tort liability is an anachronism and should be eliminated is
Professor Edwin Borchard of the Yale School of Law.20 2 He has
prepared model statutes which might be enacted to accomplish the
purpose.20 3 One such model draft contains the following provisions:
Section [1B] as used in this Act, the term "municipal
corporation" includes every county, city, school district,
district established by law and other political subdivisions
of the state.
Section [2B] Subject to the limitations of this Act,
every municipal corporation of this state shall be liable in
an amount not exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars (?)
to every person who sustains damage to his property, or in
an amount not exceeding Seventy-five Hundred Dollars
to every person who sustains personal injury or death if the
199 OHIo GE. CODE §2408 (1937), quoted supra p. 398.
200N. Y. Laws, 1936, c. 323, N. Y. Gnx. MuN. LAW §50-6 (1942).
201N. Y. Laws, 1941, c. 852, N. Y. Gmx. Mur. LAW §50-6 (1942). Omo
GEN. CODE §3714-1 (1938) has from the beginning covered accidents on
highways as well as on streets but has always been limited to municipal
corporations.202 Borchard, State and Municipal Liability in Tort-Proposed Statu-
tory Reform. 20 A.B.A. J. 747-752, 793-794 (1934).
203Borchard, Proposed State and Local Statutes Imposing Public
Liability in Tort, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 282 (1942).
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damage to the property or injury or death was either (1)
proximately caused by the wrongful or negligent act or
omission of any officer of the municipal corporation acting
within the scope of his authority, or (2) proximately caused
by any defect or insufficiency in any public streets, high-
ways, buildings, grounds, works, property, machinery, ve-
hicle or appliance, provided such defect or insufficiency
was due to the wrongful or negligent act or omission of
such municipal corporation, officer or employee.
20 4
The model act then provides in detail for notice and other matters
incident to suit.205
It is probable that extension of liability or complete abolition
of immunity would affect the smaller municipalities and subdivi-
sions more seriously than the larger ones. It is -also probable that
the smaller towns and counties would present strong opposition to
such a proposal if the effect of it were to leave them subject to in-
definite liability. Professor Borchard has discussed this phase of the
problem and has proposed the following statute to deal with it:
Section [1L] In the case of a county, city, municipal
corporation, school district, district established by law, or
other political subdivision [i.e. municipal corporation] hav-
ing a gross revenue from taxation from all sources of less
than $250,000 per annum, the said county, city, municipal
corporation, school district, district established by law, or
other political subdivision [i.e. municipal corporation] shall
contribute to the general fund of the state an amount per
annum not less than two per cent of its gross revenue from
taxation from all sources, in lieu of direct liability for pri-
vate claims established by this Act; but in that event, the
settlement, adjustment, and allowance of claims against
the said subdivision shall'be reviewed and may be revised
by the State Administrative Board, and all suits arising
out of the claim shall be brought against the state jointly
with the county, city, municipal corporation, school district,
district established by law, or other political subdivision
[i.e. municipal corporation] primarily liable.20 6
With the change in the Federal law represented by the Federal
Tort Claims Act207 it seems an appropriate time to reconsider and
to revise the state law pertaining to public liability for torts. Ohio
might do that which has been done in the past, follow the lead of
New York. It would be most enheartening if Ohio statesmen would
follow the suggestions of Professor Borchard and lead us completely
out of the wilderness of sovereign immunity.
204 Id. at p. 298.
205 Id. at p. 299 et seq.
206 Id. at p. 310.
207 See Walker Administrative Settlement of Claims Under The Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, 9 OHIo ST. L.J. 445 (1948); Comment, 9 OHto ST. L.J.
471 (1948).
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